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Abstract
Problem: It is estimated that 5 to 10 arc flash explosions occur in electric equipment every day in the United States. In the mining industry
the largest single injury category of electrical injuries are caused by non-contact electrical arcs. Method: This investigation progressed in
two phases: (a) 836 Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) reports of electric arcing incidents that occurred over a period of
11 years were reviewed, and (b) personal interviews were conducted with 32 individuals. A theoretical Safe Job Performance Model guided
the study. Results: Behavioral dimensions were identified and included the effect of worker experience, judgment and decision-making
ability, behavioral and organizational controls, and safety culture. Summary: The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) conducted an investigation of behavioral components associated with arc flash incidents and developed recommendations for
interventions based on findings. Impact on Industry: This study fills a vacuum in electrical training with a focus on the organizational
and behavioral aspects of arc flash incidents. The research is cross-cutting in its scope, in that the results apply not only to mining and
construction, but many other industries employing electricians. Although the majority of mine electrical injuries are the results of burns
from electrical arcs, few miners are aware that such a hazard exists. A safety training program, which includes a video and an instructor's
discussion guide, was developed for electricians based on this study's findings. “Arc Flash Awareness” was released in 2007 (DHHS NIOSH
Publication No.2007-116D) and is available through 1-800 CDC INFO. Phone: 1-800 232-4636 or email cdcinfo@cdc.gov. It is also
available from MSHA at MSHADistribution@dol.gov or 304-256-3257 (DVD-576). Private industry is producing Portuguese and Spanish
language translations.
National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
An electric arc results from the release of electrical energy
through the air when high voltage exists across a gap
between conductors. Staged tests using mannequins at the
Paul Gubany High Power Laboratory in 1996 repeatedly
demonstrated that electrical arcs are highly unpredictable
and variable in occurrence, energy, path, and duration (Jones
et al., 2000).
Arc faults give off thermal radiation and bright, intense
light that can cause burns to the body, especially to the skin
and eyes. Next to the laser, the electric arc is the hottest event
on earth, with recorded temperatures as high as 35,000° F
(McCabe, 2005). High-voltage arcs can also produce a con-
siderable pressure wave by rapidly heating the air and pro-
ducing a blast that may exceed 200 lbs/sq ft (978 kg/sq m).
This pressure burst can send molten metal droplets from
melted copper and aluminum components in electrical
equipment great distances at extremely high velocities. In
addition to direct personal injury from these hot metals, arc
blasts can throw a worker against nearby objects or walls,
causing secondary injuries such as blunt force trauma, cuts,
and abrasions. The impulse sound wave near the unprotected
ear can also result in temporary or permanent traumatic
hearing loss.
“Non-contact” arc flash burns refer to electrical burn
injuries without accompanying electric shock. The person
receiving the arc burn never actually contacts an energized
electrical conductor. The burn occurs, therefore, when the
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worker is exposed to sufficient electromagnetic radiation
from an electric arc. The radiation covers a wide band of
the electromagnetic spectrum, from the infrared and visi-
ble range to well beyond the ultraviolet. The burn can range
from a mild reddening of the skin (1st degree) to complete
destruction of skin, underlying muscle, and connective tis-
sue (3rd degree) (Capelli-Schellpfeffer, 2004).
The hazards of a non-contact electric arc flash are present
at most industrial workplaces. CapSchell, Inc. estimates that
5 to 10 arc flash explosions occur in electric equipment every
day in the United States (Fischer, 2004). In the mining
industry, during one recent 12 year period, 36,373 lost work
days were recorded for all electrical injuries. The largest
single injury category within this total was non-contact elec-
trical arc injury. These incidents resulted in three fatalities,
more than 12,000 lost work days (one-third of the total), and
an average of 21 lost work days per incident (Kowalski-
Trakofler et al., 2003).
Personal accounts from electricians also note that many
workers have experienced some degree of exposure to an
electric arc flash during the conduct of their work. However,
because these occurrences did not result in an injury, they were
not reported. Explanations for escaping injury have ranged
from “pure chance” to practicing properwork procedures, such
as using personal protective equipment (PPE).
The population of workers who may be affected by
electric arc flashes could be on the rise. In 2002, the U.S.
Department of Labor reported there were 659,000 electri-
cians on the job. Projected growth of the number of jobs
available by 2012 is an estimated 814,000 electricians on the
job. This is higher than other similar technical professions.
With this increase in electrical workers and the fact that
non-contact arcing incidents can result from human error
as well as from equipment malfunctions, it may be inferred
that accidents related to human behavior could also be on the
rise.
Non-contact arcing incidents can be spontaneous, such as
in the following example:
An electrical foreman and an electrician had just
replaced a 480-volt circuit breaker panel with a 1000-
volt circuit breaker panel. Following this, the 7200-volt
transformer power was re-energized; however, the circuit
breaker could not be energized. The electrician began to
look at the ground check relay as the source of the
problem when an electric arc occurred. After the smoke
cleared, it was observed that the 1000-volt circuit
breaker panel was leaning outward as it had been left
unbolted by the foreman and the energized line side 995-
volt connections had contacted the transformer frame.
This produced an electrical arc that resulted in serious
burns to both hands and face of the electrical foreman.
In addition, non-contact arcing incidents can result from a
worker inadvertently bridging electrical contacts with a
conducting object. Other causes of arc flash hazards may
include actions such as dropped tools and the build up of
conductive dust and corrosion. Arcing faults can also occur
with direct current, such as mine DC trolley systems or
batteries (Hall, Myers, & Vilcheck, 1980).
Standards for protecting workers against the hazards of an
arc flash are included in NEC 2002 (National Electric Code);
IEEE Standard 1584 (Institute of Electrical & Electronic
Engineers); OSHA 29 CFR 1910 (Occupational Safety and
Health Administration); and NFPA 70E (National Fire
Protection Association). NEC 110.16 requires arc flash
warning labels to raise the level of awareness of electrical arc
flash hazards. IEEE Standard 1584 addresses arc flash
calculations for arcing faults, incident energy, and flash
boundary. OSHA requires that “live” parts greater than
50 volts to ground be deenergized unless the employer can
demonstrate that deenergizing introduces additional hazards
or is infeasible. In the 1970's, OSHA requested the NFPA to
develop a standard for electrical safety for workers. The
latest edition of NFPA 70E was completed in 2004. It is the
most widely applied electrical safety standard for employee
workplaces today. Most notably, it is the first standard to
specifically include arc flash PPE in work practice require-
ments, as it contains the most protective PPE requirements in
the world. Among its many safety practices, it proposes
training for all workers exposed to potential arc flash or
electrical shock hazards. This includes both task-qualified
workers as well as electrically unqualified workers.
OSHA enforces NFPA 70E under the “General Duty
Clause” in the 29 CFR 1910 (Code of Federal Regulations),
which requires employers to furnish a workplace that is free
from recognized hazards that may cause death or serious
physical harm. According to this mandate, training is
required for unqualified as well as qualified employees.
This training is left to the employer to administer and can be
given on the job or in the classroom. In effect, all employees
who face the risk of electrical injury are required to be
trained. The strategy found in NFPA 70E includes training
for all workers exposed to potential arc flash hazards. This
includes operators who may be “task qualified” to operate a
disconnect, electrically unqualified workers, and office
personnel. All are required to be trained in the basics of
electrical safety to prevent unqualified persons from entering
live work and arc flash zones (Hoagland, Shinn, & Reed,
2004a,b).
Commercially available electrical training programs
generally focus on technical skills, instrumentation, safe
operating procedures, and personal protective equipment.
Protective equipment, including clothing, is one way of
preventing arc flash injury. In recent years, much effort has
been applied to various types of flame-resistant clothing and
to determining weights and construction of natural fibers that
resist ignition. In short, the level of protection must match
the category of the hazard and, in addition to thermal
protection, the PPE system must also be comfortable and
durable (Laverty, 2001). Accepted PPE includes flame-
resistant clothing, flash suits (for high-energy arc exposure),
flash suit hoods, insulating gloves, and insulated tools. These
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are in addition to the normally used hard hat, safety shoes,
safety glasses, and hearing protection. Face shields, which
are generally protective against arc hazards, have also
become available for workers. Some negative factors
associated with face shields include decreased peripheral
vision, increased heat, and worker discomfort. At any energy
level, nevertheless, face shields can help protect workers
from much of the flying metal particles produced by the arc
(Hoagland, 1996).
Protective clothing, though, does not take the place of
proper safety training. Michael Enright, an executive with a
commercial supplier of flame-resistant clothing stated that,
“Safety equipment should be the last line of defense. There
are a number of things that can be done on the front end
from the initial engineering design of the equipment, to the
maintenance of the equipment, to the training of the indi-
vidual who operates the equipment” (Naso, 2004, p.44).
Left out of most training programs, however, is instruction
on individual and organizational behavior that attempts
to influence workers' and employers' attitudes, beliefs, or
behaviors.
There is a growing body of research that indicates job and
organizational level factors have a powerful influence on safe
behavior and the occurrence of accidents/injuries (DeJoy,
Gershon, & Schaffer, 2004). One such factor is safety climate
or safety culture, which is defined as the shared perceptions of
workers about the level of safety in their workplace. Employee
perceptions about safety are important because workplace
injuries have been correlated with safety climate, such that
organizations with strong safety climates consistently report
fewer injuries than organizations with weak safety climates.
There are several key factors associated with a safe
workplace. A safe workplace typically features strong man-
agement committed to occupational safety programs where
safety is integrated into the structure of the organization
and there is adequate support for the safety manager. Also,
in safe workplaces, safety performance is assessed peri-
odically, and employees receive feedback on their perfor-
mance. Another important factor associated with a safe
workplace is the use of experienced workers to train younger
workers in safety procedures and policies along with worker
involvement in safety activities, such as worker safety tool
talks before shift and joint labor/management safety com-
mittees. Safe work environments emphasize housekeeping
and workplace cleanliness. In addition, previous studies have
shown that younger workers as opposed to older workers
have a higher frequency of accidents. However, older work-
ers tend to have more severe accidents and are away from
work for longer periods of time as a result (Fotta & Bockosh,
2000).
Given the rising number of incidents, a multi-disciplinary
team of NIOSH researchers led an investigation of non-
contact arc flash incidents by studying various individual and
organizational behavioral aspects of past incidents. This
paper identifies many of these behavioral characteristics and
proposes training interventions, which, if eventually devel-
oped into instructional exercises, could reduce the frequency
and severity of arcing incidents.
2. A Model for Safe Job Performance
This study is part of a larger, ongoing NIOSH project in
which engineering solutions are being investigated to limit
arc flash incidents. To coordinate the overall effort of the
project, the authors developed a theoretical Safe Job
Performance Model. The model, illustrated in Fig. 1,
Fig. 1.
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combines engineering controls with administrative and
behavioral components along with specific skills. The core
of the model is the safety climate or the work environment of
the company or organization. Making up this core are six
components that serve as a foundation to support both the
organization and the individual to ensure safe job perfor-
mance. They include engineering controls, administrative
controls, behavior controls, technical skills, knowledge, and
judgment and decision-making ability.
Engineering Controls, or interventions, are physical ma-
nipulations of the sources of the hazard or the manner of
exposure to the hazard. Examples include controlling noise,
chemical exposure, heat, erecting barriers, positioning switches
for safer use, and redesigning electrical tools and equipment.
Administrative Controls are initiatives by management to
modify a work process or exposure. Examples of adminis-
trative interventions might be developing a standard
operating procedure, and adjusting work practices such as
job rotation or better shift schedules. Also, training is
sometimes considered an administrative intervention.
Behavioral Controls focus on influencing workers' and
employer's attitudes, knowledge, belief, or behaviors
concerning work hazards or issues of worker health.
Examples include training workers to wear PPE, implement-
ing behavior modification techniques such as feedback to
instill safer behavior, and promoting programs to encourage
worker health, such as stop-smoking plans.
Technical Skills refer to the hands-on skills and abilities
needed to get the job done and complete the electrical task
successfully. Technical skills explain “how” a worker does
the job.
Knowledge refers to the basic information needed in order
to understand the process of the electrical task. Knowledge is
an important underpinning of safe job performance. Workers
need to understand the task within the context of the overall
job, in addition to having the skills to perform the task.
Judgment and Decision-making refers to the workers'
ability to make sound and safe decisions. Most electrical
training programs today include the important subject areas
of “technical skills” and “knowledge.” Thus, the addition of
administrative and behavioral controls, and judgment and
decision-making ability can enhance the effectiveness of
these training efforts. This model may have application not
only in the development of a training program, but also as a
tool to evaluate an electrical safety program. NIOSH reports
that program evaluation is a key issue in training. NIOSH
researchers note that during the past 40 years, knowledge of
the causes of work-related disease and disability has grown
dramatically, however, “ways to evaluate occupational
health and safety interventions is sparse” (Goldenhar &
Schulte, 1996).
3. Method of Study
The investigation was conducted in two phases. Phase
One involved a review of 836 MSHA narratives of electric
arc incidents that occurred in the mining industry over an
11 year period. Phase Two followed with 32 personal




The subjects were 836 individuals who experienced an
arc flash incident between 1990 and 2001, as reported to the
U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The
Code of Federal Regulations 30 Part 50 mandates mine
operators and independent contractors, whose employees
perform certain types of work on mine property, to file a
Mine Accident, Injury and Illness Report for reportable
incidents within 10 working days after the incident or
diagnosis. The information reported includes demographics
of the injured/ill worker such as age, sex, years of total
mining experience, and years of experience at current mine,
as well as information related to the mine location where the
incident occurred, days away from work, days of restricted
work activity, source of the injury, body part(s) injured, and a
narrative description of the incident. The subjects in this
study's average age at the time of the incident was 39 years
and their average mining experience was 14 years. Their job
titles, collapsed from 120 different MSHA database
designations, fell into one of the following three categories:
laborer; technical; or supervisor.
“Laborer” includes rank-and-file workers, such as general
laborers and equipment operators; “technical” refers to
mechanics, electricians, and engineers; and “supervisor”
includes production foremen, electrical foremen, mainte-
nance foremen, and other supervisory personnel.
Approximately 30% of the subjects in the population
were identified in the laborer category; 54% were identified
in the technical category; and 14% were identified as
supervisors. Subjects had been in the technical job title for an
average of 10 years when the reported arc incident occurred.
3.1.2. Narratives
In the written reports MSHA mandates of all “reportable”
incidents at everymine in the United States there is a narrative
written by someone at the mine describing the incident. The
quality of the information varies widely, from highly detailed
to sketchy. These three examples show the nature of some of
the information recorded for arc flash incidents:
(Incident 1) “Employee was tightening battery terminal
on truck when the wrench he was using made contact with
metal box. The wrench when shortened made contact with
employee ring and he received third degree burn on ring
finger.”
(Incident 2) “Disconnect flashed when turning off”
(Incident 3) “The ee used ether to clean the contact points
instead of the contact cleaner as provided. Subject is a
certified electrician. He was wiring the load side of a
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400 amp circuit breaker. Evidently, the ground lead came
into contact with the A&B phase leads causing an arc and
flash when power was applied to the breaker”
In narratives such as these, information relating to
behavioral characteristics is clearly limited, so in order to
gain any insight into personal conduct of the victims, inter-
pretations and situational judgments had to be made. To this
end, a study team consisting of a psychologist, a sociologist,
and several mining engineers read the accident reports and
discussed conflicting understandings and opinions expressed
in the narratives. After a pilot study of 50 narratives each, the
team developed an evaluation criteria to apply to the narratives
to tease out useful behavior related data. Employing their
collective expertise, two principal categories were established,
namely Organization of Work and Activity.
3.1.3. Criteria
The first principal category, Organization of Work, refers
to the categorization of incidents based on key elements that
contributed to the incident. Three elements were identified
by the study team. First, if it was determined that an incident
was “beyond the control of the worker,” then it was classified
as a mechanical/technical failure. If the incident was not a
mechanical/technical failure, then the team had to make an
expert judgment about whether or not the worker “recog-
nized the hazard.” This conclusion was based on the nature
of the hazard, the victim's background, and experience as
reported in the narrative. Finally, if it was determined that the
victim was experienced enough to recognize the hazard, then
it became an issue of the worker making a decision to engage
in a specific behavior that eventually led to an incident.
The second principal category, Activity, refers to the work
activity of the victim at the time of the incident — routine
maintenance, troubleshooting, repair, or normal job. Because
the narrative data is often sketchy, two additional elements
were added — “Unknown/Undetermined” and “Other.”
Other variables taken from the MSHA accident reports
were: amount of time into shift when the incident occurred;
body parts injured; total mining experience; and job
experience when the arc flash incident occurred.
Data for total mining experience and job experience were
collapsed. For these variables, the data were recoded into
experience levels of less than 2 years; 2 but less than 5 years;
5 but less than 10 years; and 10 years or greater. Researchers
were also interested in how much time had elapsed into the
worker's shift before the incident occurred. “Time at work”
data were collapsed into the categories of less than 2 hours;




In the second phase of the study, a self-reporting
measurement technique was used to collect information
from persons who were either victims of or witnesses to an
electric arc flash event. This was a natural extension of Phase
One, as researchers sought additional, more in-depth
behavioral data. It was decided that personal interviews of
such individuals could provide valuable insight into both
individual and organizational behaviors. The MSHA Na-
tional Mining Academy helped identify subjects in the
mining industry and the International Brotherhood of
Electrical workers identified workers in general industry.
Because the focus of the investigation was on the human and
organizational behavior aspects of arc flash incidents it was
not important what industry the subject's represented.
Participants were asked to give a detailed account of the
event, their work activities at the time of the incident, their job
experience and qualifications, and a retrospective evaluation of
their arc flash incident. For the latter, subjects were asked to
assess, from their perspective, causes and possible prevention.
Additionally, participants were asked to complete a six-item
survey about the safety climate in the workplace where the
arcing event occurred. Researchers adapted questions from the
general NIOSH Generic Job Stress Questionnaire Safety
Climate Survey for this study (NIOSH, Division of Behavioral
and Biomedical Sciences; DeJoy et al., 2004; Zohar, 1980).
The focus of each interview was on the person's
description of various behavioral aspects of the event, not
on its technical features. Thirty of the interviews were
conducted in person; two were completed by phone.
3.2.2. Subjects
The sample consisted of 32 persons; 27 were arc flash
victims and 5 were witnesses to an arcing event. Eighteen of
the subjects were working in the mining industry when the
incident occurred and 14 were employed in general industry.
Fifteen of the 18 mining industry workers were employed at
underground mines, and 3 were working at surface
operations. The final sample size was determined by the
“saturation” of responses. That is, when researchers hear the
same information from subjects again and again, saturation
in data gathering has been achieved.
The number of subjects interviewed at that point would
represent the complete sample (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The
present study reached saturation after interviewing 32
persons.
Assistance in locating subjects was provided by State and
Federal (MSHA) mine district personnel, independent mine
trainers, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW). Subject participation was voluntary and
anonymous.
3.2.3. Focused Interview Guide
The data collection instrument used in this study was an
interview guide (Appendix A). Four separate interview
guides were developed. Each focused on a different group of
subjects. The four groups and the number of persons in each
group included the following: victim of an arc incident
working in the mining industry (13); witness to an arc
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incident working in the mining industry (5); victim of an arc
incident working in general industry (13); and witness to an
arc incident working in general industry (1).
The interview guide consisted of both open-ended and
closed-ended (yes or no) questions. An “other” category was
added to allow subjects to respond in any way they liked. In
effect, this allowed researchers to further explore the
respondents' thoughts. The questions covered demographics
of participants, incident details, victim/witness perceptions
about the incident, and organizational safety culture. Two
researchers and the interviewee met in a quiet setting at the
person's workplace. Notes were taken by the researchers
during the interviews, and all information was coordinated,
coded, and incorporated into a Microsoft Excel file for
reduction and evaluation.
Participants were asked not to identify themselves or their
company in writing by name. Thus, the information was
totally anonymous and subjects were assured of confiden-
tiality. The amount of time extended per interview ranged
from approximately one hour to well over two hours. Net
interview time depended upon the respondent's motivation
and interest in contributing to the discussion.
To assess the safety of the work culture at the time of the
incident, questions from the NIOSH generic safety climate
survey were adapted and completed by each subject.
Responses to the six questions (Appendix A) were asked
using a rating scale of 1 to 4. One is associated with a less
safe or more negative safety culture, and 4 represents a safer
or more positive safety culture.
3.2.4. Limitations of the study
This is a descriptive study utilizing a causal–comparative
method and, as such, can only be used to explore causal
relationships, not confirm them. The sample is a non-
probability one called a haphazard sample of convenience.
Since the selection of collaborators was indiscriminate and
arbitrary, it is obviously not a representative sample, and
results cannot be generalized. Nevertheless, participants did
enable researchers to achieve their objective, as they
supplied first-hand information of actual arcing incidents
and, thus, provided documented insight from which
particular aspects of their behavior before, during, and
after the arc event could be identified. This study, as in all
self-report studies, is limited by the subject's recall. In
addition, the limitations of the MSHA narrative data must be
noted as discussed earlier.
4. Results
4.1. Phase One
Analyses were performed using the evaluative criteria
described in the Method of Study section. In the first element
of theOrganization of Work category, Mechanical/Technical,
a total of 284 of the 836 incidents (∼34%) resulted from
electrical component failure. It was determined that these
cases had no organizational or behavioral component, so
they were eliminated, and the remaining 552 cases were used
for the analysis.
Under the second element, Hazard Recognition, in the
categoryOrganization of Work, subjects did not recognize the
hazard in 45% (251 of 552) of the cases. In 55% of the cases,
workers did recognize the hazard. For example, if a qualified
electrician worked “live” when it was not necessary, it was
concluded that, based on his qualifications, training, and
experience level, he should have recognized the hazard in
performing the task and turned the power off before starting.
The third element, Judgment and Decision-making,
combined recognition of the hazard with judgment and
decision-making. For example, if a qualified electrician was
injured because the power was not turned off, and it was not
absolutely necessary to work “live,” then researchers
determined that the subject made a choice to work “live.”
In this element, subjects recognized the hazard and made a
choice to engage in a specific behavior that led to injury in
nearly 55% of the cases (301 of 552).
Looking at all 836 cases with regard to the job title
categories of laborer, technical, and supervisor, it was found
that laborers who had been in their occupation less than two
years incurred a larger proportion of incidents than technical
(more qualified) workers who had been in their jobs the same
amount of time. However, in looking at both classifications
of workers — laborers and technical — after 10 or more
years of experience, a larger proportion of incidents were
incurred by the technical workers. In other words, the more
experienced technical personnel were victims of a larger
proportion of the arc flash incidents than the laborers in the
study population. Moreover, the large majority of technical
workers in this group were qualified electricians.
With respect to the job title categories at the time of the
incident, most workers injured by arc burns were “elec-
tricians” or “mechanic/repairmen” (technical). They com-
prised 54% of all cases. For supervisors, the proportion of arc
flash incidents resembled those for technical personnel, with
the largest proportion of incidents occurring to supervisors
with 10 or more years in their job. With respect to work
activities for all occupations of workers, 74% of arc burn
incidents occurred to those doing maintenance/repair/
troubleshooting activities.
Electricians incurred 84% of their injuries while per-
forming “electrical maintenance/repair” services, while
mechanics sustained more than 52% of their injuries
performing “electrical maintenance/repair” activities, usually
identified as troubleshooting. Troubleshooting was the single
most frequent work activity in which the victims were
engaged.
Approximately 20% of the accidents happened less than
two hours into the shift, almost 25% occurred in the second
two hours, and approximately 23% happened between four
and six hours into the shift. It was found that the largest
proportion of injuries, approximately 32%, occurred 6 hours
or more into the worker's shift.
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Finally, for electricians in the study population, 45% of
the arc flash burn injuries occurred to the hand or fingers;
28% to the eyes; and 16% were to the wrist, arm, and
forearm. In a large majority of the incidents, injuries
occurred to multiple parts of the victim's body.
4.2. Phase Two
In the focused interview guide discussed in the Method of
Study section, six open-ended questions and a six-item
safety climate survey were posed to the subjects.
The first question related to certain demographics of the
victims/witnesses and the specific details of their arc flash
incidents. The majority of participants (∼72%) were
classified as electricians. The number of years working in
this job title ranged from 3 to 37 years, and 87% of the
sample had more than 6.5 years of experience in their job
title when they had the arc flash incident. The age of subjects
at the time of the incident ranged from 24 to 55 years old.
The average was 37 years old with 16 years electrical
experience. Nine of 10 victims were qualified to perform the
electrical tasks in which they were involved when the arc
incident occurred. In 87.5% (28 of 32) of the incidents, the
subjects had received formal electrical training and were
certified electricians. Further, almost three-fourths of the
victims had five or more years of electrical experience.
Nearly 60% of voltages in which an arcing incident
occurred were 480 volts AC. The working voltages ranged
from 440 AC to 4160 AC and from 128 DC to 560 DC. Eight
of 32 participants were involved in DC arcing incidents.
Most of these occurred with trolley systems in underground
mines. Twenty-three of the 32 subjects (78%) were
performing maintenance/repair or troubleshooting when the
arc flash incident occurred.
Subjects were asked if they were injured and which body
parts were affected. Twenty-eight of 32 said they were
injured. They reported arc burns to the hand and fingers
(41%); eyes (34%); and wrist, arm, and forearm (38%). More
than 90% of the incidents resulted in injury to multiple parts
of the body.
Next, subjects were asked to describe, in as much detail as
possible, the arc flash incident in which they were involved.
Their responses provided ample amounts of first-hand data
from which some behavioral information could be gleaned.
Here is an example of one incident description:
A qualified electrical maintenance foreman with 4 years
of electrical experience was doing troubleshooting work
on the lighting circuit on a continuous miner. He began
his investigation by pulling fuses at the 480 V to 110 V
transformer feeding the circuit. He was looking for
continuity in the lighting circuit (110 V AC) side of the
transformer. His volt-ohmmeter was set on resistance
and everything checked out. He then began to check for
power at the 480 VAC fuse holder. In a hurry to get the
continuous miner running as soon as possible, he
accidentally left his volt-ohmmeter set on resistance. As
he began to check for power on the high voltage side of
the transformer, the meter exploded and a phase to phase
arcing–fault occurred at the fuse holder. He received 3rd
degree burns on approximately one-half of his right
hand. In his own words: “I was lucky I didn't get hurt a
lot worse because I wasn't wearing safety glasses or
gloves. I was careless and worked on something that was
energized and didn't need to be because I was in a
hurry.” He indicated the incident absolutely could have
been prevented. He also said from that point on, he made
it a practice to work on any electrical problem only with
proper PPE.
Additional behavior information was provided in several
follow-up questions about their perceptions of the incident
they just described. The first question was “Do you believe
this incident could have been prevented? If yes, how could it
have been prevented?” Nearly 94% of the participants (30 of
32) stated that the incident could have been prevented. The
two leading explanations for how it could have been
prevented were appropriate use of PPE — 47% (15 of 32)
and lockout/tagout / shouldn't have worked live — 41% (13
of 32).
The next question asked the subjects to indicate what they
feel is important in preventing arc flash incidents. Responses
included don't work in such a hurry; be more careful; don't
take shortcuts; think the job through; better job preparation;
follow accepted work procedures; and don't be complacent.
Other replies to this question were better maintenance of
electrical equipment and better communication and become
aware of other workers' actions.
When asked why arc flash incidents happen and what
these incidents have in common, the leading group of
responses included the following:
• hurrying to get the job done - (16 of 32)
includes don't want to inconvenience customer and pro-
duction pressure
• inadequate electrical training - (10 of 32)
includes work not done by “qualified” electrician
• complacency - (10 of 32)
includes lack of attention to task
• carelessness - (6 of 32)
• working “live”- (6 of 32)
includes failing to lockout/tagout
Other noteworthy responses to the questions of why arc
flash incidents happen and what they have in common
included not following accepted procedures; poor mainte-
nance of equipment; not using PPE; insufficient planning to
see job through; worker out of position in work area; poor
judgment; using improper testing equipment; and lack of
communication.
Subjects were then asked what could be done to make it
less likely that workers would be exposed to arc flashes. The
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leading responses were wear PPE — (10 of 32); turn power
off — (9 of 32); follow rules and policy procedures — (8 of
32); and modify design of electrical equipment — (6 of 32).
Other suggestions included training in awareness of arc
dangers; don't take chances; think the job through; and eli-
minate bad habits. Several of these suggestions are noted in
the following account:
A qualified electrical general inside laborer with 6 years
of electrical experience was running a 15-ton GE motor
that was hauling empty supply cars on a Saturday
maintenance shift. The pole on his motor jumped the
300 VDC line and wedged between the belt hanger and
top of an overcast. He got off the motor on the tight side
of the entry and grabbed the base of the “harp” pole
with his bare hands. The pole arced between the trolley
and the trolley hanger and injured him with flash burns
to his eyes and the taste of copper in his mouth. He also
got shocked as he became a grounded part of the circuit
and was thrown against the ribs. In his own words: “I
was in a hurry and I didn't think the job through. I had
picked up a bad habit learned from older miners.” He
said the incident absolutely could have been prevented if
he had put on his gloves and not looked at the pole. He
also said he was going too fast and that is what caused
the pole to jump in the first place.
The last part of the interview guide related to organiza-
tional behavior (i.e., the safety climate where persons
worked when they experienced an arc flash event). Subjects
rated each of six questions (refer to Appendix A, Part B) on a
scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (Strongly Agree), with 24
points representing the maximum score. Safety climate
responses were grouped as follows: 6 to 15 — poor; 16 to
20 — average; and 21 to 24 — good. Results showed that
∼27% of the subjects (8 of 30) reported a poor safety
climate;∼46% (14 of 30) reported an average safety climate;
and ∼27% (8 of 30) said they had a good safety climate.
5. Summary and Discussion
The main objective in this study was to learn of the
individual and organizational behavioral factors associated
with non-contact arc flash incidents. This was accomplished
by investigating various aspects of past incidents, as detailed
in official MSHA accident reports, and by conducting
personal interviews with victims and witnesses to arc flash
events. Information was obtained in two phases: (a) by
reviewing 836 mining industry electric arc burn accident
reports, and (b) by interviewing 32 persons from mining and
general industry who had been victims in arc flash incidents.
The subjects in Phase One represent the population of
victims of arc flash incidents in the mining industry over an
11-year period; therefore, their demographic data are
statistically reliable. However, as noted earlier in the
discussion of the narratives, behavioral data were subject
to interpretation. In contrast, subjects in the second phase of
the study did not come from a statistically representative
random sample. As a result, neither the demographic nor
behavioral data collected and reported in this phase can be
used to characterize the population of workers who have
incurred an arc flash injury. In addition, the incidents
subjects reported in some cases happened 15 years previ-
ously, while other incidents happened in the past few years.
Thus recall bias must be taken into account. Regardless of
these limitations, information is reported that appears to be
meaningful to the extent that it should be given consideration
in designing interventions for preventing or reducing the
occurrence and severity of arc flash injuries.
It was observed in both phases of the study that most
victims in these arc flash incidents, regardless of the industry
in which they worked, were experienced electrical persons
who had more than 10 years on the job at the time of the
incident. This is meaningful because it opposes the historical
expectation that more job experience equals fewer accidents
and injuries. The subjects in Phase One averaged approx-
imately 9 years of job experience; the victims in Phase Two
averaged 16 years of electrical experience. The large major-
ity of victims in Phase One and Phase Two had also received
formal electrical training and were certified electricians.
The subject of electrician training and certification came
up in dialogue with several of the interviewees. An issue
seldom considered by organizations in hiring electricians is
the need to evaluate their electrical qualifications and
specific experience. The first question usually asked
concerns the qualifications and certifications of the electri-
cian. This query is normally completed by the human
resources department. The second question concerns the
individual's experience. This usually is not investigated in
depth, as there is an expectation that an individual certified as
an electrician can do anything electrical. An interviewee
shared an experience with the researchers wherein his
company had hired an electrician. When a problem arose
with the battery-operated power center, the electrician
realized that he had worked at mines with electrical current
and had no idea how to work on this battery. He was
qualified, but he did not have experience in this area of
electrical work and consequently was injured. Checking
performance on specific tasks is the manner in which
proficiency is determined.
The most common job classifications of arc flash victims
at the time they were injured were electricians and mechanic/
repairman. “The most common work activity of nearly three-
fourths of the subjects was electrical maintenance/repair or
troubleshooting.” There is no established curriculum for
electricians in repair and troubleshooting. Companies may
provide workers troubleshooting on the company's specific
equipment, and when a new piece of equipment is purchased,
the manufacturer usually trains the workers. In Phase One, it
was found that approximately one-third of the arc flash
incidents in these work activities occurred after more than six
hours into the shift. This “time-into-shift” data suggests that
workers may have been careless, fatigued, or hurrying to get
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the job done. These explanations are among the several
reasons given by Phase Two subjects for why arc flash
incidents happen.
The data suggests that one of the more important
conclusions in this study is that many workers knew of the
potential consequences of their actions, yet made a decision
to engage in risky behaviors that led to arc flash incidents.
Using the argument that victims had, on average, significant
electrical experience and job experience, it can be conjectured
that they indeed recognized the hazards of the task in which
they were working when the arc flash incident occurred but
made conscious judgments/decisions to engage in a risky
behavior that led to the event. For example, an experienced
electrician should know when to turn the power off while
performing a specific task or when to use the correct tool.
Thus, sinceworkers withmore experiencewere getting hurt
at higher rates, it is suggested that they were either not
recognizing the hazard (unlikely) or making a judgment/
decision (more likely) to engage in a risky behavior leading to
the accident. Experienced electrical workers who have the
knowledge and know the correct procedures are making
judgments/decisions to engage in a behavior that eventually
leads to an arc flash incident. Why? Some reasons given by
Phase Two subjects included: time pressures (that is,
hurrying to get the job done because they don't want to
inconvenience the customer), production pressures, insuffi-
cient planning to see the job through, and taking shortcuts.
For these reasons, workers tend to work “live,” not use PPE,
and, in general, not follow accepted work practices.
In Phase One incidents, it was determined that in a
substantial number of instances the worker recognized the
hazard and made a decision to proceed with behavior that led
to the incident. In practically every interview in Phase Two,
the issue of making a judgment/decision to complete an
assignment by taking a short-cut was mentioned even though
the worker knew it was wrong to do so. Comments like these
were made: I was careless and did not think through the
job… I didn't follow procedure… I let the boss's time pressure
affect my judgment on what was safe…I made a decision not
to turn the power off… I have been working in this area for
many years and have made choices to take shortcuts because
I “knew” what I was doing… I figured I could do this quick
without taking the time to put on the gloves (or glasses or
other protective gear)… I had done this a thousand times and
nothing had ever happened….
Several questions relating to the prevention of arc flash
incidents were asked of the interviewees in Phase Two.
The first one asked, in retrospect, was if the incident in which
they were involved could have been prevented. Ninety-four
percent of the subjects answered “yes.” The number one
preventative measure suggested was “turn the power off.”
The data on body parts that were injured in arc flash events
are reported in both phases of this study and indicate that
the arc flash burns affected multiple parts of the body. This
finding suggests that appropriate PPE is important for
electricians, regardless of the task they are doing.
Besides the relevance of PPE for preventing arc flash
injuries, the subjects also seemed to point to the importance
of behavioral issues. Specifically, there was a recurring
behavioral theme in responses to follow-up questions
relating to what subjects feel is important in preventing arc
flash incidents; why these incidents happen; what they have
in common; and what could be done to make it less likely
that workers would be exposed to an arc flash event. Leading
responses to such questions included: don't work in such a
hurry; be more careful and don't take chances; don't take
shortcuts; think the job through; don't be complacent; follow
accepted work procedures; use PPE; turn power off.
The safety culture of an organization is generally
recognized as an important component for insuring individual
worker safety. However, arc flash incidents appeared to occur
to subjects in Phase Two irrespective of the organization's
outlook on safety. Seventy-three percent of the incidents
reported occurred to individuals whoworked for organizations
that had an average or good safety culture. It cannot be
concluded from this study that safety culture is not important,
only that with this small sample it did not seem to play a major
part in behavior. Several subjects indicated their companies
had an excellent safety culture. They also indicated that even in
the best of circumstances the unexpected can happen.
Interestingly, within the more positive safety culture,
individual decision-making represented a major part in
determining behaviors that led to the flash incident. Thus, it
may be suggested that this particular group of subjects,
working inwhat they judged to be a safety conscious company,
tookmore responsibility for their own actions. The other major
pattern in the more positive safety cultures was the pressure for
production, generally evidenced as supervisory demands.
Thus, the management's positive safety climate was not
necessarily reflected in front line supervisors, who must
balance the safety needs with production needs.
In the less positive safety cultures, workers reported
inconsistency in training and communication. In addition,
the pressure of production and supervisor demands was a
major factor in the behaviors that led to the incidents.
Deenergizing equipment before performing maintenance
and repair is clearly the best protection against the
occurrence of an arc flash. For troubleshooting activities,
however, power must usually be left on. In this case,
electrical safe work practices must be adhered to and workers
must be appropriately qualified. Focused and effective
training, not just technical but also behavioral, is perhaps
the best way to achieve this objective.
6. Recommendations
Based on conclusions from the data, the authors make the
following specific suggestions related to training:
1. Utilize the Safe Job Performance Model to guide the de-
velopment of non-contact electrical arc programs to in-
clude the hierarchy of engineering controls, administrative
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controls, and behavior controls. First,work at engineering the
hazard out of the workplace, then, apply administrative
controls such as policies and standard operating procedures,
and, finally, include behavior interventions, such as attitudes,
safety culture, and personal responsibility. Include knowl-
edge and skills necessary for safe performance and integrate
judgment and decision-making skills into training
curriculum.
2. Target at-risk populations including:
a. new, inexperienced workers (those with less than three
years on the job). This population is usually targeted
with present electrical safety programs in the acquisi-
tion of skills and knowledge.
b. qualified workers (certified electricians and mechanics
with 10-16 years or more experience). MSHA desig-
nated job categories of electrician and mechanic/
repairman
c. supervisory personnel
3. Method: Use a recommended training format for adult
learners. Utilize methods proven successful for adult
learners, such as hands-on instruction, experiential
classroom learning, on-the-job-training, coaching, and
building on the worker's knowledge.
4. Content of training for electrical safety programs should
focus on technical skills, knowledge, and judgment
decision-making skills. Overall, present programs pro-
vide very good skills training and electrical knowledge
acquisition. The authors suggest that introducing a
judgment and decision-making curriculum including
awareness and hands-on problem solving situations
could impact the frequency of non-contact electrical arc
incidents. This content would include a discussion of the
reasons why qualified electricians choose unsafe beha-
viors, and it would include findings from this study.
Electrical safety curriculum should raise awareness of
activities performed that have been shown to be more
dangerous, specifically troubleshooting and repair activities.
Present training seems to focus on installation and
maintenance. The authors suggest that attention also needs
to be paid to the non-routine type of activities found daily on
the job, such as troubleshooting and repair. Safer techniques
to perform these activities need to be developed. In addition,
discussion of increased vigilance six hours into a shift should
be included in the curriculum.
Use appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).
PPE can reduce injuries to the hand, fingers, eyes, wrist, arm,
and forearm. PPE can mitigate the extent and severity of arc
flash injury. One individual in the study said, “Always be
prepared to ‘gear-up.’ No matter how smart you are or how
well trained, no one can prevent the unexpected from
happening, so be prepared.”
It is judicious to acknowledge that human behavior does
affect the application of engineering and administrative con-
trols and the success of behavioral interventions. Interventions
on the worker level should not be discouraged by supervisors
or peers. Non-contact arc flash incidents will continue to
happen. The authors want to emphasize that, in their analysis
the single, most important finding from this study is the key
role that judgment and decision-making play in the frequency
and severity of injury in these incidents. Raising awareness,
through training of worker's on-the-job judgments and
decision-making would be an important step toward reducing
these serious, debilitating, and sometimes fatal incidents. The
authors recommend further study in this area.
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Appendix A
Non-Contact, Electric Arc Burn Injuries
MV Interview Guide / 2004
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information from miners who have been the victim of a non-contact, electric
arcing incident.
Background
Eight hundred and thirty-six non-contact, electric arc burn incidents were reported to MSHA between 1990 and 2001. These
incidents resulted in three fatalities and more than 12,000 lost workdays (LWD). This number of lost workdays accounted for over
one-third of all LWDs due to electrical injury in the mining industry during the eleven-year period. A review of narratives for these
incidents indicated that the most dangerous types of work activities for causing arc burn injuries are electrical and machine
maintenance/repair.
This type of injury has become more common because modern mining practices require higher capacity electrical distribution
systems that have heavy, available short circuit currents and energies that can initiate and sustain electrical arcing faults. In an effort
to reduce the incidence and severity of arc burn injuries, NIOSH is developing training recommendations for the purpose of
improving hazard recognition and judgment/decision making skills of miners for recognizing and avoiding electrical hazards that
could result in arcing incidents.
(A) Non-Contact, Electric Arc-Induced Burn Injury Incidents
1. The following questions relate to you, the victim of a non-contact electric arcing incident. Please answer them as carefully as
possible. If you need more writing space, use the back of this sheet.






b. What was your job title and years of experience in that job when the incident occurred?
Years Experience
Electrician ______
Mechanic / Repairman ______
Laborer ______
Other: ____________ ______
c. What voltage were you working with at the time of the incident? (check one)
660 V ______
661–1000 V ______
More than 1000 V ______
Other (specify) ______
d. What was your age at the time of the incident?
e. Were you a qualified electrical person when the incident occurred? Yes No
f. If yes, how did you become qualified?
1. Training (specify):
2. Experience (specify):
g. How many years had you been a qualified electrical person when the incident occurred?
h. Were you injured in the incident? Yes No
i. If yes, which body parts were injured?
j. Describe, in detail, what happened in the incident.
k. Do you believe this incident could have been prevented? Yes No
l. If yes, how could the incident have been prevented?
2. From your experience, which of the following are important in preventing arcing injuries?
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c. Changes in work procedures or practices
Describe the changes?
d. Other factors
3. Why do you believe non-contact, electric arcing accidents happen?
4. What do most non-contact, electric arcing incidents have in common?
5. What could be done to make it less likely that miners would be exposed to electric arcing?
6. Considering the different tasks in aMineElectrician’s job,which ones aremost likely to cause the electrician to become exposed
to arcing?
Please indicate howmuch you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about safety behavior in themining company
where you worked when you had the arcing incident.
Use this scale for each statement and circle your choice.
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4
1. New employees were told up front that they
were expected to follow good safety practices.
1 2 3 4
2.There were no significant compromises or
shortcuts taken by management when
worker safety was at stake.
1 2 3 4
3. Employees and management acted together to
insure the safest possible working conditions.
1 2 3 4
4.Employees were warned when they did not
follow good safety practices.
1 2 3 4
5. The safety of workers was a big priority with
management where I worked.
1 2 3 4
6. I felt free to report safety violations to my supervisor or 1 2 3 4
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